This is Part 4 of 4, of Miniatur Wunderland’s giant model airport, Knuffingen. This is by far the most scale and detailed model of it’s kind with several dozen aircraft, airlines, ground scenery, equipment, including fully functioning landings and takeoffs. Thanks for watching and please subscribe.
Tags: Airport, Knuffingen, Miniatur, Wunderland
The radio spectrum, a scarce resort
One of the most basic activities in a cockpit is tuning the radio to the assigned frequency of whoever we want to talk to. Contacting ground control, the tower or one’s own company is done by turning a few knobs until the right numbers show in the radio control panel display and we can talk.
Air traffic controllers see the same thing slightly differently. They do not normally have to tune their radios. The proper frequencies for their sector or other working position are pre-set and need no further attention.
With the matter being so pedestrian and the actions so routine, few of us realize that the ability of pilots and controllers to talk to each other is in fact dependent on one of the scarcest resources in aviation, namely the radio spectrum allocated to aviation use.
Many other disciplines have their own radio spectrum and we all guard jealously what we have been given and for good reason. With so many users wanting to use the radio waves, the incumbents better watch or the use it or lose it principle kicks in. Luckily, the frequencies most widely used by aviation (118 – 137 MHz) are not coveted so strongly by others. Our problem is different but not in the least less serious.
VHF fundamentals
VHF is a line-of-site system. This means that two stations can talk to each other assuming that they are tuned to the same frequency and they can “see” each other (from a radio point of view). If one of the stations is below the horizon of the other station, communications becomes impossible.
Being tuned to the same frequency means that both stations are tuned to the same pre-defined frequency which is within the aviation band. These pre-defined frequencies are separated by agreed “spaces”, expressed in kHz. The spaces ensure that communications taking place on adjacent pre-defined frequencies do not interfere with each other. And herein lies the problem!
You can only pre-define a limited number of frequencies with the required spacing between them if you are to stay within the aviation band. There are many more sectors, towers and other aeronautical stations that need their own, discrete frequencies than there are frequencies available. So what do we do?
The line-of-sight character of VHF radio waves offers a solution of a kind. You can re-use the frequencies if you ensure that the usage areas of each are separated sufficiently so that no interference occurs. Frequencies only used close to the ground can be re-used much more readily than can those used at higher levels. The horizon of these latter is much wider and hence aircraft hundreds of miles away might be heard by a center that has nothing to do with it if the frequency assignment is not done properly.
Reuse not enough? Cut the spacing!
I am not sure who was the first one to bolt a radio on an aircraft, but the idea caught on quickly and soon enough the problem of frequency shortages was born.
Originally the spacing between the frequencies was 200 kHz, providing just 70 channels between 118-132 MHZ as the band was back then (1947). In 1958, he spacing was reduced to 100 KHz, doubling the number of channels to 140.
In 1959 the upper limit of the aviation band was expanded to 136 MHz, giving us another 40 channels, bringing the total to 180.
In 1964, the channel spacing was halved again to 50 kHz, resulting in 360 channels being available.
These dates show not only aviation’s ever increasing hunger for frequencies, but also the evolution of aviation radios. In the 1950s no radio set would have been suitable for work with 50 kHz spacing. By 1964, 50 kHz was the standard with more to come…
The channel spacing was further cut to 25 kHz in 1972, doubling the available channels to 720. Seven years later, in 1979, the upper limit of the aviation band was once again expanded, this time to 137 MHz and this delivered another 40 channels, bringing the total to 760.
In 1995, the proposal was made to reduce the channel spacing to 8.33 kHz. Theoretical number of channels: 2280!
This may sound like radio channel nirvana but in real life things are never that simple.
The underlying reasons for the channel hunger
The need for ever more frequencies was driven mainly by the dramatic increase in the number of control sectors in the en-route ATC environment. As traffic grew, air traffic service providers had to split sectors into ever smaller chunks to enable controllers to cope. Each new sector needed its own frequency and most of the sectors were in the upper airspace, hence the re-use distance between identical frequencies was very big. This translated into a seemingly insatiable hunger for ever more discrete frequencies.
By the mid-1990s it became clear that the existing VHF system would not be able to make available the required number of frequencies. This would put an end to the creation of new sectors, severely limiting the ATC system’s ability to handle the increasing air traffic demand.
Curiously, there seemed to be a mismatch in the magnitude of the problem as seen in the US and in Europe.
While traffic density on the Eastern Seaboard of the US was in fact higher than the busiest areas in Europe, the US frequency managers had no problem satisfying the FAA’s demand for new frequencies. At the same time, in Europe, with its lower traffic density, the alarm bells were being sounded that frequency doomsday was nigh.
So what was happening?
To understand this, it is important to remember that frequency managers in European States were part of the communications side of things, often coupled with the old postal monopolies, and they were not really given to international cooperation or worries about aviation’s problems outside their own land. That aviation was no longer a purely domestic affair had apparently not really touched them.
Although the States never formally admitted this, most of the frequency shortage was due to poor management of the available frequencies. Valuable frequencies were dormant, never used or simply left there in the dust after the organization originally using it had long disappeared.
The airspace users did raise the issue, brought several examples but to no avail. The local czars of frequency management did not relent and hence there was no other choice but to look at technology based solutions.
The choice between 8.33 kHz channel spacing and VDL Mode 3
While the immediate driver behind the effort to find a solution to the frequency shortage was the fear of skyrocketing delays, experts had been saying since the late 1980s that the complete aviation communications system needed overhaul. The VHF AM voice system and the freshly identified future need for air/ground digital link communications all argued for a common solution that would address the frequency shortage as well as the future communications needs.
Keep in mind that in other areas of communications huge advances were taking place at around the same time while aviation was still trying to make up its mind whether or not to replace a voice communications system that had changed little since the 1940s and which was clearly struggling to keep up with demand.
In the United States a system called VDL Mode 3 was being proposed. This system would have enabled four digital channels to be used on every existing 25 kHz channel and would have provided non-voice data link capability also. There were not many believers outside the US in the feasibility of this technology though and it has still not been implemented anywhere.
In Europe, the splitting of the channel spacing to 8.33 kHz was being put forward as the best solution. Missing a once in a lifetime opportunity, the industry did not examine any long-term alternatives…
The 8.33 decision and what followed
As mentioned earlier, the airspace users were not at all convinced about the need to spend money on aircraft modifications when in their view the frequency shortage was mainly due to poor management of the aviation spectrum.
It was in this ambivalent mood that the industry gathered to attend the ICAO European Regional Air Navigation Meeting (EUR RAN) in 1994 where proposals to address the frequency shortage were also to be discussed and decisions made.
For the current generation of ATM decision makers it may be of interest to mention how most decisions were made back then. Seeking a solution to the frequency shortage, 8.33 kHz was picked up without ever considering possible alternatives and without looking at cost-benefit aspects, user impact or the longer term communications requirements. Clearly not something to bring back… ever.
The airspace users, with the specter of even more serious delays hanging over their heads and with their protests brushed aside, had no choice but to note the mandate: 8.33 kHz in European upper airspace as of 1st January 1998.
The ICAO European Air Navigation Planning Group (EANPG) was charged with organizing the introduction of the new channel spacing. The EANPG in turn requested EUROCONTROL to develop a transition plan and manage its implementation.
This is a very important detail that needs to be remembered. To this day, airspace users tend to blame EUROCONTROL for the whole 8.33 issue when in fact EUROCONTROL was only the agent appointed by ICAO (the States you may say) to carry out the implementation. They did an excellent job and it is not EUROCONTROL’s fault that they had to orchestrate the realization of a less than optimal solution. If we consider that EUROCONTROL had to deal with all the ICAO member states in Europe (49) and had to manage the creation of a mixed 25 kHz/8.33 kHz environment, the eventual achievement of the goals is even more laudable.
Mr. Murphy and the 8.33 implementation plan
“If it can go wrong, it will” – states Murphy’s first law and this was certainly true of this implementation.
EUROCONTROL, quite correctly, had decided early on to establish a project oriented organization to handle the matter and they also had the good sense of requesting the participation of outside experts from organizations like IFATCA and IATA to ensure direct links to the end-users of the new system.
Right from the start the project was up against a time problem. With the first project steps being taken only in early 1996, the 1 January 1998 deadline was clearly a big question mark. So, the first delay kicked the deadline back to 1 January 1999 and the second delay to 7 October 1999.
Why the delays? The rate of equipage of course was the primary and decisive factor.
In many mandated aircraft equipage scenarios you see the equipage curve rising slowly in the beginning, as only a few aircraft are fitted, then as the deadline approaches, the curve becomes very steep but usually does not reach 100 % before the mandate date. What does this mean?
Obviously, airspace users do not want to spend money too early and fly around with the new equipment without it bringing any benefits. When the time comes and fitting becomes inevitable, there is a mad rush to equip, which in turn can result in a shortage of equipment and an overloading of the shops performing retrofits. In the end, inevitably, there are aircraft left out in the cold, not being able to meet the mandate!
All of this had happened in the case of 8.33 and then more.
When the project started, there were no 8.33 kHz capable radios on the market. A few pre-production samples had been produced, but nothing anyone could buy. In spite of the clear mandate, the presence of the competing VDL Mode 3 system and the fact that 8.33 would only be required in Europe somehow led the manufacturers to slow product development and not produce anything until their customers came with definite orders. The customers on the other hand were reluctant to place orders until closer to the mandate deadline which had to be put off as a result of low equipage rates because of a scarcity of radios! A vicious circle if ever there was one… At times meetings of the 8.33 project team had an air of most participants wishing the whole thing would just go away…
Then there were the aircraft themselves. No matter how advanced the new radios were 8.33 kHz is a very small distance between channels and trials on various aircraft revealed surprising behaviors. Radios on the Boeing 767 for instance worked well while the doors were open but started to produce interference the moment they were closed…
Controllers were fretting about what would happen if pilots regularly mistuned their radios. True, for the first time ever, the numbers seen on the radio control panel do not show the real frequency of an 8.33 spaced channel and this can be confusing.
Issues with the new radiotelephony expressions were also on the agenda for while.
In the end however, the final deadline came and went and the new system worked pretty well. Apart from a few isolated incidents no problems were reported and 8.33 kHz, like any other part of the ATM system, became part of the European scene.
Next steps?
In the meantime, EUROCONTROL has continued to manage the implementation of 8.33 kHz, extending its use also into the lower airspace. They have fulfilled and continue to fulfill the role assigned to them by the EANPG and the benefits specific to 8.33 kHz will no doubt continue to accrue. It is even rumored that the FAA also wants to look into 8.33 kHz channel spacing for introduction in the US.
Did the benefits materialize?
It all depends on how you want to measure the benefits. If the measure is the number of requests for new frequencies that could be accommodated, then the outcome of the exercise is definitely positive. At the very first Frequency Block Planning Meeting held after the introduction of 8.33 kHz channel spacing, 57 of the 59 requests were accommodated, an absolute first. The level of subsequent request satisfactions shows a similar pattern.
It is very likely that a comparison with a “do nothing” scenario would show that investing in 8.33 kHz was not a bad idea.
On the other hand, 8.33 kHz did create the impression that the problem was solved and the motivation to really address the shortcomings of this obsolete communications system has all but disappeared. Back around the time the 8.33 kHz decision was made, it might have been easier to also initiate the development of a new system that would by now provide services to the pilots on a par with what passengers are getting in the near future.
As it is, we are left with a legacy system which will be much more difficult to replace on an industry level now, not least because of the sad shape airlines are in these days.
It is a pity that the EUR RAN meeting in 1994 did not have the vision to look beyond the immediate solution to the problem of frequency shortages.
Refinance Consolidation Home Closing
Tags: Channel, Goans, Graduating, Passport, Portuguese, Spacing
Slide Show of 2nd Annual ADRL Gatorz Ohio Drags at Summit Motorsports Park in Norwalk, Ohio. Norwalk Raceway’s website had the one race titled both, Mac Tools Showdown and Mac Tools Shootout. I am not sure which is correct, so it is written both ways in this video…one way in the beginning and the other way toward the end.
www.gotmachinery.com Universal Machining Operations at 5 Work Stations Punching, Cutting, Notching with 121254 lbs Capacity Flat Steel Cutters * lower knife provides 4 cutting edges * table with angular and linear stops Angular Profile Steel Cutters * rear stop adjustable up to 40″ with automatic cut activation Rod Steel Station * hold-down for round and square steel * rear stop 40″ Hole Punch Station * for punching sheet metals, flat steel and U-section steel * heavy-duty table ensures high-quality punching results * infinitely variable stroke adjustment * including adapter for “Peddinghaus” punches and dies * hydraulic overload valves Notching Station table with scales and stop
Rectangular Steel Tubing Granite Countertops
Tags: GotMachinery, Machine, Machinery, Worker
Background:
Southwest Airlines is the largest airline measured by number of passengers carried each year within the United States. It is also known as a ‘discount airline’ compared with its large rivals in the industry. Rollin King and Herb Kelleher founded Southwest Airlines on June 18, 1971. Its first flights were from Love Field in Dallas to Houston and San Antonio, short hops with no-frills service and a simple fare structure. The airline began with one simple strategy: “If you get your passengers to their destinations when they want to get there, on time, at the lowest possible fares, and make darn sure they have a good time doing it, people will fly your airline.” This approach has been the key to Southwest’s success. Currently, Southwest serves about 60 cities (in 31 states) with 71 million total passengers carried (in 2004) and with a total operating revenue of $6.5 billion. Southwest is traded publicly under the symbol “LUV” on NYSE.
Facts:
* The first major airline to fly a single type of aircraft (Boeing 737s)
* The first major airline to offer ticketless travel system wide including a frequent flier program based on number of trips and not number of miles flown.
* The first airline to offer a profit-sharing program to its Employees (instituted in 1973).
* The first major airline to develop a Web site and offer online booking. In 2001, about 40 percent ($2.1 billion) of its passenger revenue was generated through online bookings at [http://www.southwest.com]. Southwest’s cost per booking via the Internet is about $1, compared to a cost per booking through travel agents of $6 to $8.
Key competitive advantages:
* Low Operational costs / High Operational Efficiency
* Award winning customer service
* Human Resource practices / Work culture
Operations Analysis – Competitive Dimensions:
Southwest clearly has a distinct advantage compared to other airlines in the industry by executing an effective and efficient operations strategy that forms an important pillar of its overall corporate strategy. Given below are some competitive dimensions that will be studied in this paper.
1. Operational Costs and Efficiency
2. Customer Service
3. Employee/Labor Relations
4. Technology
1. Operational Costs and Efficiency
After all, the airline industry overall is in shambles. But, how does Southwest Airlines stay profitable? Southwest Airlines has the lowest costs and strongest balance sheet in its industry, according to its chairman Kelleher. The two biggest operating costs for any airline are – labor costs (approx 40%) followed by fuel costs (approx 18%). Some other ways that Southwest is able to keep their operational costs low is – flying point-to-point routes, choosing secondary (smaller) airports, carrying consistent aircrafts, maintaining high aircraft utilization, encouraging e-ticketing etc.
Labor Costs
The labor costs for Southwest typically accounts for about 37% of its operating costs. Perhaps the most critical element of the successful low-fare airline business model is achieving significantly higher labor productivity. According to a recent HBS Case Study, southwest airlines is the “most heavily unionized” US airline (about 81% of its employees belong to an union) and its salary rates are considered to be at or above average compared to the US airline industry. The low-fare carrier labor advantage is in much more flexible work rules that allow cross-utilization of virtually all employees (except where disallowed by licensing and safety standards). Such cross-utilization and a long-standing culture of cooperation among labor groups translate into lower unit labor costs. At Southwest in 4th quarter 2000, total labor expense per available seat mile (ASM) was more than 25% below that of United and American, and 58% less than US Airways.
Carriers like Southwest have a tremendous cost advantage over network airlines simply because their workforce generates more output per employee. In a study in 2001, the productivity of Southwest employees was over 45% higher than at American and United, despite the substantially longer flight lengths and larger average aircraft size of these network carriers. Therefore by its relentless pursuit for lowest labor costs, Southwest is able to positively impact its bottom line revenues.
Fuel Costs
Fuel costs is the second-largest expense for airlines after labor and accounts for about 18 percent of the carrier’s operating costs. Airlines that want to prevent huge swings in operating expenses and bottom line profitability choose to hedge fuel prices. If airlines can control the cost of fuel, they can more accurately estimate budgets and forecast earnings. With growing competition and air travel becoming a commodity business, being competitive on price was key to any airline’s survival and success. It became hard to pass higher fuel costs on to passengers by raising ticket prices due to the highly competitive nature of the industry.
Southwest has been able to successfully implement its fuel hedging strategy to save on fuel expenses in a big way and has the largest hedging position among other carriers. In the second quarter of 2005, Southwest’s unit costs fell by 3.5% despite a 25% increase in jet fuel costs. During Fiscal year 2003, Southwest had much lower fuel expense (0.012 per ASM) compared to the other airlines with the exception of JetBlue as illustrated in exhibit 1 below. In 2005, 85 per cent of the airline’s fuel needs has been hedged at $26 per barrel. World oil prices in August 2005 reached $68 per barrel. In the second quarter of 2005 alone, Southwest achieved fuel savings of $196 million. The state of the industry also suggests that airlines that are hedged have a competitive advantage over the non-hedging airlines. Southwest announced in 2003 that it would add performance-enhancing Blended Winglets to its current and future fleet of Boeing 737-700’s. The visually distinctive Winglets will improve performance by extending the airplane’s range, saving fuel, lowering engine maintenance costs, and reducing takeoff noise.
Point-to-Point Service
Southwest operates its flight point-to-point service to maximize its operational efficiency and stay cost-effective. Most of its flights are short hauls averaging about 590 miles. It uses the strategy to keep its flights in the air more often and therefore achieve better capacity utilization.
Secondary Airports
Southwest flies to secondary/smaller airports in an effort to reduce travel delays and therefore provide excellent service to its customers. It has led the industry in on-time performance. Southwest has also been able to trim down its airport operations costs relatively better than its rival airlines.
Consistent aircrafts
At the heart of Southwest’s success is its single aircraft strategy: Its fleet consists exclusively of Boeing 737 jets. Having common fleet significantly simplifies scheduling, operations and flight maintenance. The training costs for pilots, ground crew and mechanics are lower, because there’s only a single aircraft to learn. Purchasing, provisioning, and other operations are also vastly simplified, thereby lowering costs. Consistent aircrafts also enables Southwest to utilize its pilot crew more efficiently.
E-Ticketing
The idea of ticketless travel was a major advantage to Southwest because it could lower its distribution costs. Southwest became electronic or ticketless back in the mid-1990s, and today they are about 90-95% ticketless. Customers who use credit cards are eligible for online transactions, and today Southwest.com bookings account for about 65% of total revenue. The CEO Gary Kelly thinks that this idea would grow further and that he wouldn’t be surprised if e-ticketing accounted for 75% of Southwest’s revenues by end of 2005. In the past, when there was a 10% travel agency commission paid, it used to cost about $8 a booking. But currently, Southwest is paying between 50 cents and $1 per booking for electronic transactions that translate to huge cost savings.
2. Employee and Labor Relations
Southwest has been highly regarded for its innovative management style. It maintains a relentless focus on high-performance relationships and its people-management practices have been the key to its unparalleled success in the airline industry.
Mission Statement
To Our Employees
“We are committed to provide our Employees a stable work environment with equal opportunity for learning and personal growth. Creativity and innovation are encouraged for improving the effectiveness of Southwest Airlines. Above all, Employees will be provided the same concern, respect, and caring attitude within the organization that they are expected to share externally with every Southwest Customer.”
The Southwest mission statement shows that the company has a strong commitment to its employees. The company affords the same respect to its employees that is provided to its customers. The Southwest mission statement is unique in that it recognizes the importance of its employees within the broader business strategy, which emphasizes superb customer service and operational efficiency. The employees reciprocate the respect, loyalty and trust that Southwest demonstrates. Southwest employees are known for their loyalty, dedication, attitude and innovation. The employees are the distinguishing factor between Southwest and the rest of the airline industry.
Hiring
Southwest hiring policy is unique not only within the airline industry, but also more broadly, and revolves around finding people with the right attitude that will thrive in the Southwest culture. Extensive procedures are employed to hire for positive attitude and dedication. Those who do not posses those qualities are weeded out. Colleen Barrett, a non-operational officer at Southwest, states that
“Hiring is critical, because you cannot institutionalize behavior. Instead, you must identify those people who already practice the behaviors you are looking for. Then you can allow Employees to be themselves and make decisions about Customer service based on common sense and their natural inclinations.” 1
Recruiting and interviewing at Southwest is a two-step process. The first step is a group interview, conducted by employees, where communication skills of potential candidates are evaluated. The next steps in this process are one on one interview, where the candidates’ attitudes and orientation toward serving others are evaluated. These hiring criteria apply to all job functions since all Employees at Southwest play a customer service role. A critical part of Southwest operational strategy is that every job at Southwest is a customer service position, whether it directly applies to the customer or whether it is internal.
The table below shows that even though Southwest is the most heavily unionized airline, at approximately 80%, that contract negotiations between the unions and Southwest are much shorter in duration than of the other major carriers. This shows the quality of relationship that Southwest has with its employees and with the unions that represent them.
Culture
Southwest was created as a different kind of company and from its beginnings a unique culture was nurtured. In 1990 Colleen Barrett formed the Southwest Culture Committee. This is unique within the industry and among all large companies. The committee also has a mission statement:
“This group’s goal is to help create the Southwest spirit and culture where needed; to enrich it and make it better where it already exists; and to liven it up in places where it might be “floundering”. In short, this group’s goal is to do “whatever it takes” to create, enhance, and enrich the special Southwest spirit and culture that has made this such a wonderful Company/Family.”
It is this unique approach to company values that has created a culture that differentiates itself from others. Southwest’s culture is the reason why it is successful.
3. Customer Service
The Mission of Southwest Airlines
The mission of Southwest Airlines is dedication to the highest quality of Customer Service delivered with a sense of warmth, friendliness, individual pride, and Company Spirit.
Approach
Herb Kelleher, founder of Southwest, has been quoted as saying that “We’re in the Customer service business; we just happen to provide airline transportation”.2 Award winning customer service is a distinguishing characteristic of Southwest and it is referred to internally as “Positively Outrageous Service”. It means that from the top to bottom everyone does whatever he or she can to satisfy the customer. This includes Herb Kelleher, who has been known for helping out baggage handlers on Thanksgiving. It is through emphasizing the customer and employee that Southwest is able to differentiate itself from others in the airline industry. On a more technical level, each employee or group within Southwest has his or her own customer. This means that every employee ‘serves’ in one way or another despite not being directly involved with the passenger. The mechanic’s customer is the pilot and the caterer’s is the flight attendant.
Results
It can be said that the “Positively Outrageous Service” that is unique to Southwest “is not the result of a department, or a program, or a mandate from management. It is not secondary to the product; it is the product.” This approach creates the conditions where Employees are more likely to treat customers in ways that distinguish the company from others. There are numerous accounts of passengers who have received exceptional treatment from Southwest employees.
The question that needs to be answered is how Southwest’s customer service is different and why? Is it common for customers of other airlines to rave about their special service? The answer is that it is not. While Southwest does not have a monopoly on people who are kind and who are willing to go above and beyond to satisfy a customer, such behavior is nurtured at Southwest to a much greater extent.
It can then be concluded that the customer service that is inherent to Southwest is a part of its culture. This culture is supported through employee encouragement to do the extra to satisfy the customer. This approach inspires people who would ordinarily only on occasion go out of their way to help someone, to become consistent performers that offer exceptional service all the time. Southwest employees are what differentiate its customer service from the other airlines.
4. Technology
Southwest utilizes technology in many ways to fulfill its business objectives and maintain its efficient operations. According to its CEO, technology equals productivity. Launched in 1996, ticketless travel was first introduced by Southwest. On May 1st 2000, Southwest Airlines introduces “SWABIZ,” a portal that assists company travel managers in booking and tracking trips made through its web site [http://www.southwest.com]. There are many new technology initiatives being undertaken currently and some are in the pipeline.
Bar codes in Boarding Passes
Southwest Airlines has invested $12 million during the past three years to standardize corporate and terminal operations on about 10,000 Dell OptiPlex desktop and Latitude notebook computers according to its company executives. Southwest wanted to replace its well known, brightly colored plastic boarding passes with an electronic system with bar-code paper boarding passes. So it installed about 350 touch screen ticket readers powered by Dell OptiPlex desktops. The bar code gives Southwest more information to automatically reconcile the number of boarding passes with the number of passengers that actually board the plane.
Although the technology will help Southwest Airlines remain efficient by consolidating passenger information for the company’s 3,000 daily flights, there were concerns it could lengthen the time to get travelers on board. However it was found that scanning each bar code on the boarding passes didn’t increase or shorten boarding schedules, but it did take minutes from administrative processes, such as looking up customer records. The new paper bar code system is giving Southwest ticket agents the ability to match a customer record within having to scroll through and log into multiple software screens. The process is much more automated. Once the bar code on the boarding pass is scanned at the terminal gate it checks off the person from the passenger list in real time.
The old process was manual that involved finding the information, scrolling through several software screens from reservations to check-in to boarding. The bar code hardware to scan the boarding passes has been deployed. The company is in the process of replacing customer service back-office equipment at airports including at its headquarters in Dallas.
Software Upgrades
Software applications, such as those used by clerks to check in passengers, are being replaced. Southwest Airlines’ internally written “Airport Application Suite” is expected to rollout next year as the company transitions from green screens to Window-based user interface. Similar to Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Southwest Airlines believes in developing in-house the software that runs its operations. The company uses very little off-the-shelf software. There are between 75 and 100 projects in the works each year supported by approximately 900 IT employees.
RFID
Radio frequency identification technology, a favorable alternative to bar-coding for luggage identification, is also on Southwest’s radar. It plans to test RFID technology sometime in 2006. Even though, Southwest is playing a little catch-up with other airlines such as Air Tran, Alaska and Champion Airlines, in many cases they are able leapfrog to more sophisticated applications easily having waited longer.
Challenges:
Southwest has emerged very successful, despite the most troubled times in the airline market. However, it faces new challenges in the face of increasing competition from other low fare airlines such as JetBlue, ATA airlines, America West.
Reserved Seating
Due to increasing security guidelines since September 2001, Southwest would need to prepare for assigned (reserved) seating to track its in-flight passengers. This change will involve large technology investments and may impact its gate operations negatively since the current way of unassigned seating has helped in quick gate turnarounds.
Passenger Demand
The keep-it-simple philosophy has served Southwest well. But as its own business grows and grows more complex, with plans to purchase dozens of new aircraft and an expected upsurge in passenger traffic to about 80 million boarding’s a year, the simplicity strategy that has been reflected in the airline’s IT philosophy is evolving. The CIO Tom Nealon says that “It’s time to adapt our business processes for efficiency. As our airline scales for us to provide the same kind of high-touch customer service, we have to automate a lot of things we’ve been able to do without technology previously. The challenge is doing that without conceding the customer touch.” Southwest is also aggressively pursuing customer relationship management (CRM) techniques and has applications to get insight into customer’s wants and dislikes. According to an interview with its CEO Gary Keller, Southwest has its focus on improving in two areas – customer’s airport experience and in-flight experience.
In-Flight Entertainment
In an overall effort to improve customer’s in-flight experience, in-flight entertainment is something that Southwest is currently evaluating and which JetBlue has been very successful at already because of its introduction in its long-haul flights. In comparison, Southwest has 415 airplanes to consider and that represents an investment decision at a whole new dimension. Additionally, Southwest has to consider how things may fit into their environment. At this point, 60% of its service is still very short haul. Southwest needs to be mindful of the fact that a certain approach that has been successful for its competitor may not be necessarily work to its advantage.
Summary:
Southwest has long been regarded as a benchmark in its industry for operational excellence. Southwest Airlines is a fine example of a company that is committed to its core competencies – efficient operations to drive its low cost structure, outstanding delivery of customer service and innovative HR management practices. We hope this paper provided a good insight into Southwest operations, as part of its overall strategy, to achieve success and gain competitive advantage.
References:
1. [http://www.southwest.com] (Southwest airlines official web site)
2. “Southwest keeps it simple” – Air Transport World, April 2005, Pg 36
3. “Around the World on $48 (or So): How High Can Discount Airlines Fly?“ Strategy Management – Knowledge@ Wharton Newsletter Oct 5, 2005
4. TechWeb – [http://www.techweb.com/wire/ebiz/173601227]
5. “Southwest’s Strategy for Success: Consolidate!” – Oracle Magazine (Sept/Oct 2004 edition) http://www.oracle.com/technology/oramag/oracle/04-sep/o54swest.html
6. “Southwest Airlines: High Tech, Low Costs” – Eweek.com, April 2005
7. “Jet Fuel Hedging Strategies: Options Available for Airlines and a Survey of Industry Practices” – Kellogg School of Management Research Paper, Spring 2004
8. Winning Behavior: What the Smartest, Most Successful Companies Do Differently, Terry R. Bacon and David G. Pugh, 2003
9. Time Magazine, Oct 28th 2002 issue, Vol. 160 Issue 18, p. 45
10. “Wings Of Change”,Information Week, March 28, 2005,
11. Labor Contract Negotiations in the Airline Industry, Monthly Labor Review, July 2003, page 24
Financial Capital Buy Best Price Cheap Bamboo Plants Cheap Power Tools
Tags: Airlines, Operations, Perspective, Southwest, Strategic
admin